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Abstract: This paper investigates trends and determinants of the spatial concentration 
of China’s manufacturing industries using a large firm-level data for the time period 
of 1998 to 2005. It is found that the overall industrial agglomeration in China has 
increased steadily in recent years though it is still much lower than those of the 
well-developed market economies (such as United States, United Kingdom, and 
France). It is also found that local protectionism among China’s various regions 
obstructs China’s industrial agglomeration while Marshallian externalities facilitate 
the process of spatial concentration of manufacturing industries. On an optimistic note, 
there is evidence that the negative impacts of local protectionism have become less 
significant over time but those of Marshallian externalities are gaining in importance, 
which is consistent with the overall trend of China’s industrial agglomeration.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Since 1978, China has undergone dramatic transformations from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy. Along with this process, there have been significant 
changes in the geography of China’s industrial activities. Before 1978, almost every 
economic activity including location choice was centrally planned, and those plans 
were not necessarily drawn according to market forces but rather influenced by 
political considerations. For example, in the late 1960s, there was a drive to relocate 
production of key industrial products from coastal areas to interior provinces in 
preparation for wars with neighboring countries and regions. With economic reform, 
it is expected that economic forces for industrial agglomeration should have redressed 
some of poor location choices of economic activities caused by central planning and 
played an important role in determining China’s economic geography.  
 
However, both anecdotal evidence and statistical analysis suggest that the same 
economic reform in China has led to the rise of local protectionism among China’s 
various regions, which in turn slows down the process of industrial agglomeration as 
would have been determined by the economic forces. Indeed, a key policy introduced 
in China’s economic reform is that of fiscal decentralization, under which the local 
governments can share tax revenue with China’s central government. This policy is a 
double-edged sword, providing the local governments with strong incentives both for 
developing the local economy and for protecting local firms and industries from 
regional competition. Based on aggregated sectoral data and inter-regional 
input-output tables, Young [44] and Poncet [36] argue that local protectionism in 
China grew more and more serious over the 1990s. Meanwhile, Fan and Wei [16] find 
that both the pattern and the speed of price convergence in China are highly 
comparable with those measurements in well-developed market economies, and thus 
provide support for the view that the Chinese economy has been gradually 
transformed into a market-oriented economy. Using industry-level data, Bai, Du, Tao, 
and Tong [6] show the degree of industrial agglomeration in China first went down 
and then climbed up during the period of 1985-1997, and they also find that local 
protectionism has greater effects on industrial agglomeration than scale and external 
economies do during that sample period. Contrasting China’s coastal area with its 
interior for the period of 1985-1994, Fujita and Hu [18] find that China’s industrial 
production showed strong agglomeration toward the coastal area, and that income 
disparity between the two areas had been increasing.  
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The economic forces for industrial agglomeration, against those of local governments’ 
incentives for protecting local firms and industries, make the study of China’s 
economic geography exciting and challenging. In this paper, we use a large data set of 
China’s manufacturing firms for the period of 1998 to 2005 to study the amalgam of 
economic and political forces shaping China’s industrial agglomeration.  
 
A critical theoretical condition for industrial agglomeration is the free flow of goods 
and services across regions without any political interference, but reality is often just 
the opposite. Local protectionism slows down the process of industrial agglomeration 
within a country, similar to the adverse impacts of national protectionist policies on 
international trade and specialization.1 Despite their importance, studies on impacts 
of protectionist policies have been quite limited mainly due to the measurement 
difficulties. In this paper, we discuss the central and local government relations in 
China, and develop two indirect measures for local protectionism – local taxes to sales 
ratio and share of state-owned output, which are proxies for the incentive of local 
government officials to protect local firm and industries and allow us to examine the 
impacts of local protectionism on China’s industrial agglomeration.  
 
While our focus is on local protectionism, we also take into account the main 
economic forces favoring industrial agglomeration. First, it is the spillover effects, the 
study of which can be traced all the way back to Adam Smith [43]. There are three 
types of the spillover effects (Marshall [31], and henceforth Marshallian externalities), 
namely, knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling, and input sharing. Second, 
industrial agglomeration could be caused by regional variations in resource 
endowments, just like that of national variations in resource endowments on 
international specialization (Ohlin [34]). This force of industrial agglomeration, 
however, hinges upon the assumption of immobility of natural, physical, and human 
resources. Third, industrial agglomeration could also arise for those industries that 
exhibit increasing returns to scale (Krugman [28]).2  
                                                        
1 In recent years, research focus has been shifted towards political factors that may facilitate or obstruct 
the process of geographic concentration of economic activities. For example, Ades and Glaeser [1] 
show that political instability is associated with urban concentration. Holmes [22] classifies states in 
the United States as either pro-business or anti-business, and finds that the manufacturing share of total 
employment increases by about one-third when one crosses the border from an anti-business state into 
a pro-business state, which suggests that state policies matter in attracting businesses.  
2 A fast-growing empirical literature has emerged and provided evidence on the validity of these 
micro-foundations of industrial agglomeration. Kim [27] and Ellison and Glaeser [14] examine the 
explanatory power of the resource endowment theory, Audretsh and Feldman [5] look into the 
importance of knowledge spillovers, Holmes [23] studies the role of input sharing, and Rosenthal and 
Strange [38] provide a comprehensive test of multiple determinants of agglomeration. See Rosenthal 
and Strange [40], and Duranton and Puga [13] for excellent surveys of recent empirical and theoretical 
studies on agglomeration economies. 
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we first describe our data set from the 
Annual Survey of Industrial Firms conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
for the period of 1998 to 2005, and then construct the Ellison and Glaeser [14] index 
(henceforth EG index) of China’s industrial agglomeration following some of the 
latest developments in the economic geography literature. We find a consistently 
increasing time trend of industrial agglomeration in China for this period in contrast 
to some of the studies in the literature (Young [44]). However, comparisons with the 
EG indices of manufacturing industries in selected developed countries reveal that the 
degree of agglomeration in China’s manufacturing industries remains considerably 
low despite its increasing trend. 
 
In Section 3, we investigate the determinants of China’s industrial agglomeration. Our 
focus is on local protectionism and Marshallian externalities, with controls for 
resource endowments and scale economies. Given the short time period of our data set, 
we first pool all the firms and years and run simple ordinary least square regressions 
on the correlation of the EG index and the variables for local protectionism, 
Marshallian externalities, resource endowments, and scale economies. To deal with 
the potential endogeneity problem, we use data from China’s third industrial census 
conducted in 1995 to construct instrumental variables and re-run the regressions. The 
main findings from both the ordinary least square estimations and the instrumental 
variable approach are: (1) the two proxies for local protectionism – local taxes to 
sales ratio and share of state-owned output – have negative and statistically 
significant impacts on industrial agglomeration; (2) the variable for knowledge 
spillovers (new products to output ratio) and the variable for both knowledge 
spillover and input sharing (exported output to total output ratio) have positive and 
statistically significant impacts on industrial agglomeration; and (3) there is evidence 
for both scale economies and resource endowment.  
 
As China has undergone dramatic changes during its economic reform, the 
importance of some of the determinants of industrial agglomeration may change over 
time. We thus split our sample into two sub-periods: 1998-2001 and 2002-2005, and 
re-run both the OLS and instrumental variable regressions. Indeed, it is found that the 
negative impacts of local protectionism have diminished in importance over time 
whereas the positive impacts of knowledge sharing have gained importance across the 
sample period. The paper concludes in Section 4 with some discussion for future 
work.  
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2. Trends of China’s industrial agglomeration 
2.1. Data 
 
The main data set for this study comes from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 
(ASIF) conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics for the period of 1998 to 
2005. The survey covered all state-owned enterprises and those non-state-owned 
enterprises with annual sales of five million Renminbi (equivalent to US$ 660,000) or 
more in the following three types of industries: (1) mining, (2) manufacturing, and (3) 
production and distribution of electricity, gas and water. Table 1a shows the number of 
firms covered in the survey throughout the sample period: it ranges from 161,000 to 
270,000. The location choice of firms in the first and third categories is heavily 
influenced by regional disparities in resource endowment. We thus focus on the 
sub-sample of manufacturing firms with the goal of investigating various 
determinants of industrial agglomeration. As shown in Table 1a, the number of 
manufacturing firms covered in the sample ranges from 146,000 to 251,000. There is 
a clear upward time trend, mainly because manufacturing firms in China have been 
growing rapidly over the sample period with more and more firms having annual sales 
of five million Renminbi or more. Following the literature (Ellison and Glaeser [14]; 
Rosenthal and Strange [38]), employment figures will be used to measure geographic 
concentration of manufacturing activities. As a result, those observations with missing 
or zero employment figures are deleted with a loss of less than 5% of the data (see 
Table 1a for details).  
 
 
Table 1a here 
 
 
There are two drawbacks with the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms dataset. First, it 
does not cover small non-state-owned enterprises. The estimation of industrial 
agglomeration could be biased, if the distribution of small non-state-owned 
enterprises varies across regions.3 Second, the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms data 
are firm-level data, not plant-level data typically used in the literature. Multi-plant 
firms have become more common since China initiated its economic reform in 1978, 
and it may affect the analysis of industrial agglomeration if this phenomenon varies 
                                                        
3 It is generally believed that, in choosing production locations, non-state-owned enterprises are less 
likely to be influenced by local government incentives and are more likely to be led by economic forces. 
The absence of small non-state-owned firms in the ASIF data implies that our analysis may 
under-estimate China’s industrial agglomeration. 
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from regions to regions.4  
 
There is an alternative dataset that is in principal the most ideal data set for studying 
industrial agglomeration: the industrial census of 1995. However, the 1995 industrial 
census data, unfortunately also a firm-level data, is of poor quality. The number of 
enterprises shrinks from 750,000 to 119,790 after the deletion of firms with missing 
value in total sales, number of employees, or fixed capital (Pan and Zhang [35]).5 
Thus in this study we use the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms as the main data 
source, and the 1995 industrial census data to construct instrumental variables for 
regression analysis. We will discuss possible future work using plant-level datasets 
and testing the robustness of our results obtained with the firm-level datasets.  
 
Information on firm location is essential for studies of economic geography. For each 
firm in the ASIF data set, there is information on its address and the name of county, 
city and province where it is located. The existing studies have shown that the choice 
of geographic scope may affect the measure of industrial agglomeration – the 
so-called border effects. More recently, there have been several studies using ZIP code 
as the basic geographic unit or even using precise location data to minimize the border 
effects (Rosenthal and Strange [39]; Duranton and Overman [12]). However, the focus 
of this study is to examine the impacts of local protectionist policies on industrial 
agglomeration. Hence, the ideal geographic scopes for this study are the ones 
corresponding to the administrative areas where local government officials can have 
policies influencing inter-regional trade and industrial agglomeration. For this reason, 
county will be treated as the most disaggregated geographic scope, followed by city 
and province.  
 
Along with China’s spectacular economic growth, its administrative boundaries and 
consequently codes of counties, cities or even provinces have experienced significant 
changes in the last thirty years. For example, new counties could be established, while 
existing counties could be combined into larger ones or even elevated to cities. From 
1998 to 2005, the number of counties in China increased from 2,496 to 2,862 (a total 
of 366), while the number of changes in county codes was 648. As firms may not be 
aware of the changes in the county codes, they may misreport in the annual surveys of 
industrial firms. Furthermore, even if the county codes reported are accurate, they 
may not be comparable across years. To address these problems, we first check the 
                                                        
4 For manufacturing firms, firm location is generally the location for production, though there could be 
multiple locations for production.  
5 Since 1998, however, a direct reporting system has been adopted by China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics, which has ensured the quality of statistical data (Holz [24]; Holz and Lin [25]). The 
1998-2005 ASIF data is thus of much better quality than the 1995 census data.  
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accuracy of the county codes based on firms’ reported addresses. Next, using the 1999 
National Standard (promulgated at the end of 1998 and named GB/T 2260-1999) as 
the benchmark classification system of county codes, we convert the county codes of 
all firms to that benchmark system.   
 
Aside from firm location, we also need information on firms’ primary industry codes 
in order to conduct a study of China’s industry agglomeration. For each firm in the 
ASIF data set, there is information on its primary 2-digit, 3-digit, and 4-digit industry 
codes. However, in 2003, a new classification system for industry codes (named GB/T 
4754-2002) was adopted to replace the old classification system (named GB/T 
4754-1994) that had been used from 1995 to 2002. To make the industry codes in the 
whole sample period (1998-2005) consistent, we convert the industry codes in the 
2003-2005 data to the old classification system by using a concordance table (in the 
case of a new 4-digit code corresponding to an old 4-digit code, or several new 4-digit 
codes corresponding to an old 4-digit code) or by assigning a new code with an old 
code based on product information (in the case of several old 4-digit codes 
corresponding to a new 4-digit code). Industrial agglomeration will then be measured 
at the 4-digit industry level, followed by 3-digit and 2-digit industry levels with 
increasing industrial scope.  
 
Tables 1b and 1c here 
 
Tables 1b and 1c give the number of firms by industry and year and the size of 
employment by industry and year, respectively. The first column is the list of 
two-digit manufacturing industries covered in the survey, which are comparable to 
those of the Standard Industrial Classification codes. There is a general trend of 
relative decline in the first half of the sample period (1998-2001), especially in terms 
of the number of firms, presumably due to the negative impacts of the 1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis, and then a trend of robust growth in the remaining sample period. All 
but three industries have seen an increase in the number of firms, but about half of the 
industries have witnessed an increase in the size of employment. These results suggest 
increasing competition (more firms but with less employment) in China’s 
manufacturing industries during the sample period.   
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2.2. Measuring China’s industrial agglomeration 
 
Most existing studies of China’s industrial agglomeration have relied on highly 
aggregated data in terms of both industrial and geographic scopes. However, measures 
based on the aggregated data may fail to give an accurate picture of China’s industrial 
agglomeration. For example, the car manufacturing industry and the bicycle 
manufacturing industry are two 4-digit industries of the same 2-digit transport 
industry, but they have different characteristics and exhibit different spatial patterns. 
Industrial agglomeration measured at the 2-digit industry level could then be 
misleading. Similarly, industrial agglomeration could be high when measured at the 
aggregated regional levels, but it is in fact low at the disaggregated regional levels, 
causing the so-called “Modifiable Area Unit Problem” (Arbia [3]). We deal with these 
problems by measuring industrial agglomeration at various industrial scopes (from 
4-digit level to 3-digit level and then to 2-digit level) and geographic scopes (county, 
city and province) (Rosenthal and Strange [39]; Devereux, Griffith and Simpson [9]). 
 
All existing studies of China’s industrial agglomeration use the measurement of either 
the Gini or the Hoover index. However, as Ellison and Glaeser [14] point out, those 
coefficients do not take into account the impacts of industrial structure and may fail to 
give an accurate measure of industrial agglomeration. To address the problem, Ellison 
and Glaeser [14] construct a model-based index of geographic concentration (called 
γ index or EG index) which takes a value of zero if employment (or output) is only as 
concentrated as it would be had the plants in the industry chosen locations randomly 
by throwing darts at a map. Theγ index takes the following form:  
( )
2
2
1
.
1 1
i r i
r
i
r i
r
G x H
x H
γ
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠≡ ⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
 
2( )i r r
r
G x s≡ −∑ is the spatial Gini coefficient, where rx is the share of total output of 
all industries in region r  and rs is the share of output for region r in industry i . 
2
i ii
H z≡ ∑ is the Herfindahl index of industry i , with iz standing for the output share 
of a particular firm in industry i . The Gini coefficient is expected to be larger in 
industries consisted of fewer and larger firms, even if locations were chosen 
completely at random (Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser [11]). The γ index is essentially 
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the difference between iG  and iH , measuring the degree of industrial agglomeration 
that is beyond the level implied by the industrial structures.  
 
The compilation of γ  requires the use of firm-level data of employment or output. 
With the firm-level data set from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, this paper 
represents the first attempt to measure China’s industrial agglomeration byγ .6 In 
principle, both employment data and output data can be used to calculateγ . 
Employment data is preferred to output data in the existing studies, as measurement 
using the output data may compound the impact of employment with that of capital.7 
In the case of China, however, there are concerns that employment data may suffer 
from the problem of surplus labor, which is especially severe in state-owned 
enterprises (see Bai, Du, Tao and Tong [6] for more discussion on the surplus labor 
problem). In this paper, for ease of comparison with the literature results, we use 
employment data to construct the EG index of China’s industrial agglomeration. 
 
 
2.3. Agglomeration of China’s Manufacturing Industries 
 
The γ  indices are calculated at various geographic scopes (province, city and county) 
and industrial scopes (2-, 3-, and 4-digit industries). Weighted means (by employment) 
of iγ indices across industries for each year of the sample period are given in Table 2a. 
Several interesting patterns can be found. First, similar to the findings of Rosenthal 
and Strange [38], the average level of agglomeration increases as one goes from 2 to 
3-digit industries and from 3 to 4-digit industries, and it is also true as the geographic 
scope goes from county to city and from city to province.8 Second, the iγ indices for 
all possible combinations of industrial and geographic scopes have increased during 
the sample period of 1998-2005, which suggest increasing geographic concentration 
in China’s manufacturing industries. These results are in contrast to the findings 
obtained using aggregate data by Young [44] that industrial agglomeration has 
decreased throughout China’s economic reform.  
 
Table 2a here 
Table 2b here 
 
                                                        
6 Using the EG index, Alecke, Alsleben, Scharr, and Untiedt [2], Devereux, Griffith and Simpson [9], 
Maurel and Sedillot [32], and Rosenthal and Strange [38] study spatial agglomeration of manufacturing 
industries in Germany, the U.K., France, and the U.S., respectively. 
7 A firm’s output reported by China’s National Bureau of Statistics measures its value added, and it is 
thus not influenced by how vertically integrated the firm is.    
8 See Rosenthal and Strange [38] for discussion of possible reasons behind the patterns. 
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Table 2b reports the EG index ( iγ ), the corresponding Gini index ( iG ), and 
Herfindahl index ( iH ) calculated at the county level for all the 2-digit industries 
throughout the sample period.9 Between 1998 and 2005, all but one industry 
(Garments & Other Fiber Products) had increasing γ  indices.10 Electronic & 
telecommunications had the biggest absolute increase in theγ index, followed by 
furniture manufacturing, and leather, furs, down & related products. Based on the γ  
indices of 2005, the three most aggregated industries are stationery, educational & 
sports goods; electronic & telecommunications; and leather, furs, down & related 
products, while the three least aggregated industries are metal products; papermaking 
& paper products; and printing & record pressing.  
 
The EG index ( iγ ) is in essence the difference between the Gini index ( iG ) and the 
Herfindahl index ( iH ), measuring the extent of geographic concentration that is 
beyond the level implied by the industrial structures. It is thus possible that industries 
with high Gini indices may have low EG indices, whereas industries with low Gini 
indices may have high EG indices. As shown in Table 2b, in 2005, tobacco processing 
ranked 20th among all industries in the EG index despite the fact its Gini index was 
the 3rd highest. It turns out that much of the industry’s high Gini coefficient was due 
to its highly concentrated industrial structure (the highest Herfindahl index among all 
industries). A counter-example is nonmetal mineral products, which ranked 16th in the 
EG index despite the fact its Gini coefficient ranked 22nd of all industries in 2005. 
This is because much of the industry’s low Gini coefficient was caused by its 
fragmented industrial structure (the lowest Herfindahl index among all 2-digit 
industries).  
 
The γ index is designed to facilitate comparison across industries, across countries, 
and over time. The iγ indices for manufacturing industries in the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and France have been studied by Devereux, Griffith and Simpson 
[9], Ellison and Glaeser [14], and Maurel and Sedillot [32], respectively, and their 
main findings are summarized in Table 2c together with ours. Note that these studies 
are carried out using data of various industrial and geographic scopes, and therefore 
the results are not directly comparable. The study of the U.S. manufacturing industries 
by Ellison and Glaeser [14] is the most comparable one to ours, given that similar 
                                                        
9 We choose the combination (2-digit industry level and county level) that gives the lowest EG index. 
10 Among 171 3-digit industries, 145 industries have increasing iγ  from 1998 to 2005; among 540 
4-digit industries, 404 industries see iγ  increased from 1998 to 2005. 
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geographic and industrial scopes are used.11 Following the definitions of not very 
concentrated industries, somewhat concentrated industries, and very concentrated 
industries in Ellison and Glaeser [14], we find that 75.98%, 16.2%, and 7.82% of all 
4-digit industries in China can be classified as not very concentrated industries, 
somewhat concentrated industries, and very concentrated industries, respectively. 
Meanwhile, the corresponding ratios for the United States are 10.00%, 65.00%, and 
25.00%. These numbers reveal that the 4-digit manufacturing industries in China are 
much less concentrated across counties than those of the United States. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn by comparing the findings of China with those of the 
United Kingdom and France. 
 
Table 2c here 
 
In summary, using firm-level data to compile the iγ indices, we find an increasing 
trend of industrial agglomeration in China for the period of 1998-2005. This is in line 
with and further supports the upward trend found by Bai, Du, Tao and Tong [6] in the 
latter half of 1985-1997 period. However, China’s industrial agglomeration remains 
lower than those in selected developed countries. It is possible that some institutional 
factors such as local protectionism may interfere with the process of industrial 
agglomeration in China. In the next section, we shall investigate various determinants 
of industrial agglomeration in China.  
 
 
 
3. Determinants of China’s Industrial Agglomeration 
3.1. Local protectionism versus Marshallian externalities  
 
 
There are three major determinants of industrial agglomeration: Marshallian 
externalities, resource endowments and increasing returns to scale. In principle, there 
is no need for us to consider the effects of scale economies, as the index of Ellison 
and Glaeser measures industrial agglomeration beyond what is implied by industrial 
structures including the extent of scale economies. Meanwhile, the impacts of 
resource endowments on industrial agglomeration are not our focus either, as 
transportation costs are decreasing and resources become mobile across regions and 
countries. We thus focus on the Marshallian externalities as the key determinant of 
                                                        
11 It should be pointed out, however, that our study is conducted at the firm level whereas theirs is at 
the plant level.  
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industrial agglomeration with some controls for both scale economies and resource 
endowments.  
 
A fundamental condition for all of the three determinants of industrial agglomeration 
is the free flow of goods or services across regions. This condition is, however, not 
readily satisfied, as witnessed by the protests accompanying the World Bank and IMF 
annual meetings. In the case of China, the fiscal decentralization policy initiated in 
China’s economic reform has given local government officials incentives for 
protecting local firms and industries as well as for promoting regional economic 
development. Indeed, as shown by Young [44], Naughton [33], and Bai, Du, Tao and 
Tong [6]), there was a rise of local protectionism in the earlier stage of China’s 
economic reform, which prohibits trade across regions and impedes the process of 
industrial agglomeration. Au and Henderson [4] find that restrictions on rural-urban 
migration in China result in a surplus of labor in agriculture and lead to insufficient 
agglomeration of economic activity in both the rural industry and urban sectors. In 
what follows, we develop variables for measuring the local governments’ incentives 
for local protectionism, variables for capturing various types of Marshallian 
externalities, and control variables for scale economies and resource endowments.  
 
 
Local Protectionism 
 
China was a centrally planned economy from 1949 to 1978. It operated with absolute 
control by China’s central government over its local governments: leaders of the local 
governments were appointed by the central government, and were instructed to follow 
the plans designed by the central government. Meanwhile, most of the industrial 
enterprises were state-owned, and they were controlled by the central and local 
governments to carry out detailed work toward the central plans. All the profits of the 
industrial enterprises were collected by the local governments and then handed over to 
the central government, which then allocated budgets back to the local governments 
as part of the economic plan. Under this system of central planning, there was no 
obvious correlation between the profits collected and handed over by the local 
governments to the central government and the budgets they were allocated. 
Consequently, there was little material incentive for the local governments to pursue 
economic growth. Similarly, the industrial enterprises were deprived of any material 
incentives, and were extremely inefficient. By 1978, the Chinese economy was in a 
terrible state, desperate for the introduction of market incentives and economic 
reforms.  
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Since 1978, state-owned industrial firms have been able to retain some of their profits 
after paying various types of taxes. Non-state-owned enterprises including 
foreign-invested firms and China’s indigenous private enterprises have been allowed 
to emerge and develop. Along with the enterprise reforms, there have been changes in 
the relations between China’s central government and the local governments. While 
the central government still has the authority to appoint the local leaders, it needs to 
consult the local people. More importantly, the local governments have been able to 
share part of the taxes collected with the central government. The introduction of this 
fiscal decentralization policy has led to strong incentives for the local governments to 
develop regional economies on the one hand and to protect local firms and industries 
from regional competition on the other hand. Local protectionism impedes the free 
flow of goods and services across regions, and slows down the process of industrial 
agglomeration. 
 
Direct measures of local protectionism are difficult to come by, as protectionist 
policies are often disguised in nature and tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative. 
Instead we look for indirect measures by focusing on the incentives of local 
government officials for protecting local firms and industries. An important concern 
for the local government officials is the degree of popular support they have from 
people under their jurisdictions, because the central government needs to consult the 
opinions of these people when appointing or promoting the local government officials. 
Local government expenditures, which create jobs and increase local economic 
activities, can win popular support for the local government officials. Thus local 
government officials care about how much tax revenues they can collect and how 
much they can keep or share with the central government.  
 
Under China’s tax system implemented since 1994, there are taxes collected and kept 
entirely by the local governments, including corporate income taxes from all 
enterprises other than those affiliated at the central government level, business tax 
from the sales of services, and personal income tax. There are also taxes shared 
between the local and central governments. The most important shared tax is the value 
added tax, of which 25% belongs to the local governments (Jin, Qian and Weingast 
[26]). The ASIF data contains four items related to taxes: value added tax, corporate 
income tax, business tax from the sales of services, and other taxes.12 We define local 
taxes as the sum of (1) 25% of value added tax, (2) corporate income tax paid by local 
                                                        
12 Other taxes include real estate tax, tax on vehicles, tax on land usage, and stamp tax, all of which are 
kept by the local governments. 
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state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises, and private enterprises, (3) business 
tax from the sales of services,13 and (4) all other taxes. We calculate the amount of 
“local taxes” for each 3-digit industry, and then divide “local taxes” by total sales of 
the industry to illustrate the relative tax contribution of an industry to the local 
governments.14 
 
Clearly the amount of the taxes collected and captured entirely by the local 
governments (items (2), (3) and (4)) for a given industry is positively correlated with 
the level of economic activity in the concerned industry. Meanwhile, value added 
value varies across industries,15 and hence it matters whether a region has the right 
mix of local industries so as to maximize the shared taxes. It is expected that, in 
industries with higher local taxes to sales ratios, local governments have stronger 
incentives to protect existing local firms from competition from other regions and also 
have stronger incentives to nurture new local firms instead of ceding markets to firms 
from other regions, both of which would result in lower degrees of industrial 
agglomeration in those industries.  
 
Besides favoring industries with higher “local taxes to sales” ratios, local government 
officials are also expected to give more protection for industries with higher 
percentages of state-owned enterprises. This is because in general government 
officials can get more private benefits from state-owned enterprises than from other 
types of enterprises. As shown by Shleifer and Vishny [42], it is easier for local 
government officials to have state-owned enterprises create more job opportunities 
and hire more local people than bribe private firms to do the same things. It is even 
more the case in China, where the official ideology of China’s Communist Party 
places an emphasis on public ownership and its legitimacy hinges upon the continuing 
                                                        
13 One important part of the business tax from the sales of services is excise on particular goods such 
as tobacco and liquor, which belongs to the central government. Unfortunately, the ASIF data does not 
provide breakdown information on excise of these special goods. Given the large amount of excise 
(RMB 163 billion in 2005) relative to total local taxes (RMB 953 billion in 2005), we exclude 11 
3-digit industries which produce products subject to excise. These industries include tobacco 
processing (3-digit industry codes 161, 162, 169), alcoholic beverages (151), daily chemical products 
(268), jewelry processing (431), special chemical products (fireworks, 267), gasoline and diesel oil 
(252), tires manufacturing (291), automobile manufacturing (372), and motorcycle manufacturing 
(373). It is for the removal of industries subject to excise that our regression analysis is carried out at 
the 3-digit level.  
14 In calculating total industry sales, we exclude enterprises that belong to the central government. 
Central government affiliated enterprises contribute little tax to local governments because their 
income tax and tax from the sales of services are collected by the central government. 
15 In 2005, value added tax to value added ratios for 3-digit industries range from 2.5% to 22.7%, with 
a mean of 9.9% and a standard deviation of 3.4%. The top three 3-digit industries with the highest 
value added tax to value added ratios are Crude oil processing (22.7%), tobacco leaf processing 
(19.7%), and cement manufacturing (17.7%). The bottom three 3-digit industries with the lowest value 
added tax to value added ratios are meter equipment manufacturing (2.5%), ship machinery equipment 
(2.6%), and relay and industrial control manufacturing (2.7%). 
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existence and development of state-owned enterprises. Indeed, China’s state-owned 
enterprises have been used for maintaining social stability and serving other social 
philanthropic purposes (Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang [7]; Bai, Lu and Tao [8]), and 
consequently popular support for the local government officials are higher in 
industries with higher degree of state ownership. We thus construct a variable share of 
state-owned output – defined as the percentage of an industry’s output contributed to 
by state-owned enterprises – for each three-digit industry, and expect that the local 
government officials would like to have stronger local protectionist policies in those 
industries with higher degrees of state ownership, thereby hindering the process of 
industrial agglomeration.  
 
 
Marshallian Externalities 
 
Ever since the seminal work of Marshall [31], externalities have been considered as a 
key driver behind industrial agglomeration. Like local protectionism, however, 
externalities are not directly measurable except in a few exceptional cases. This leaves 
us to infer their existence by indirect means. There are three types of externalities: 
knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling, and input sharing. We shall develop 
variables capturing these types of externalities.  
 
A commonly used proxy for the importance of knowledge spillovers is the proportion 
of R&D expenditure in total sales. However, as Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz and Burton 
[17] argue, formal R&D expenditure data ignore the complex process of technological 
accumulation and do not take into account R&D output performance. As a result, 
more comprehensive and outcome-based proxies of knowledge spillovers, such as 
innovation (Audretsch and Feldman [5]; Rosenthal and Strange [38]) are used. We use 
another comprehensive and outcome-based proxy of knowledge spillovers – new 
products to output ratio. In the ASIF database, output of new products is reported, and 
the variable “new products to output ratio” can be readily constructed. A product is 
identified as a new product by China’s National Bureau of Statistics only if it is 
produced for the first time at least within a province. It is possible that some of these 
new products may reflect local catch-up effort in copying new products from other 
regions or countries. To a large extent, a significant percentage of innovation in the 
developing countries such as China is in essence imitation. However, this still 
represents a step forward in product development. We expect “new products to output 
ratio” to have a positive effect on the degree of industrial agglomeration.  
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Besides knowledge spillovers in R&D and product development, there are also 
spillovers arising from information sharing. Lovely, Rosenthal and Sharma [30] 
examine whether the need to acquire information contributes to spatial concentration 
by looking at the spatial distribution of headquarters activities. Applying differencing 
methods to data on headquarters and branches of exporters and non-exporters, they 
find that when export-related information is difficult to obtain, headquarters activities 
of exporters are more highly agglomerated relative to headquarters activities of 
non-exporters in the same industry. In the ASIF data set, the basic unit of observation 
is firm, not establishment, and for this reason, we cannot distinguish between 
headquarters and branches. Instead, we hypothesize that firms in highly 
export-orientated industries are more likely to concentrate, for the purpose of 
information sharing on foreign markets. We measure an industry’s dependence on 
foreign markets by its exported output to total output ratio, and expect it to have a 
positive effect on the degree of industrial agglomeration. 
 
The expected co-location of firms in export-intensive industries could also be due to 
the incentive to share local export infrastructures and business services, or input 
sharing. Indeed many of those export-intensive industries tend to have fast growth in 
the special economic zones designated by the Chinese government in its experiments 
with economic reform, and these special economic zones have easy access to 
transportation infrastructure out to world markets. Thus, the variable exported output 
to total output ratio may capture the externalities associated with input sharing – the 
second type of externalities identified by the literature.  
 
More generally, it has been argued by Marshall [31] and others that abundant supply 
of specialized inputs could lead to geographic concentration of downstream firms. 
Holmes [23] finds a positive correlation between localization of industries and their 
degrees of vertical disintegration (i.e., input sharing), though the causality between 
agglomeration and vertical disintegration remains to be investigated. In this paper, 
following Holmes [23], we construct a variable called purchased-inputs intensity – 
defined as the ratio of purchased-inputs including raw materials to total output – to 
proxy for the degree of vertical disintegration or input sharing and expect it to have a 
positive effect on industrial agglomeration.  
 
In searching for proxies for the importance of labor market pooling in an industry – 
the third type of externalities – one needs to identify industry characteristics that are 
related to the specialization of the industry’s labor force. Rosenthal and Strange [38] 
employ three proxies: labor productivity, the percentage of management staff in the 
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total employment, and the percentage of workers with doctorate, master, and 
bachelor’s degrees. Unfortunately, the ASIF data does not contain any information on 
the education level of employees, and it does not separate employees into 
management staff and production workers either. To construct a proxy for the 
importance of labor market pooling, it is assumed that the wage level is 
commensurate with the skill level required in competitive industries. We define wage 
premium of an industry as the regional wage premium of an industry over the average 
wage in that region, averaged over all regions and weighted by the industry’s 
employment shares in those regions. Specifically,  
*
_
ir
ir
r r
i
ir
r
Wage Emp
WageWage premium
Emp
≡
∑
∑
,  
where rWage  and irWage are average wage of all employees in region r and average 
wage of employees in the 3-digit industry i  in region r , respectively. irEmp is the 
number of employees in industry i  in region r . The geographic scope is at the city 
level, and the industrial scope is at the 3-digit industry level. In calculating the wage 
premium, the wage levels at non-state-owned enterprises are used. It is because unlike 
state-owned enterprises (Gordon, Bai and Li [20]), non-state-owned enterprises are 
not shielded from market competition, and they set wage levels according to market 
forces. The higher the wage premium of an industry, the higher the skill level required 
in the concerned industry, which then implies a greater need for labor market pooling 
and more inclination for geographic concentration. Thus, we expect wage premium to 
have a positive effect on the degree of industrial agglomeration.  
 
 
Controls for scale economies and resource endowments 
 
It has been argued that geographic concentration is more significant in industries 
exhibiting greater scale economies. However, in principle, there is no need for us to 
consider the effects of scale economies, because the EG index measures industrial 
agglomeration beyond what is implied by industrial structures including scale 
economies. Indeed, for the same reason, Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser [10] and 
Rosenthal and Strange [38] do not include any proxy of scale economies in their 
empirical studies of industrial agglomeration. Recently, Alecke, Alsleben, Scharr, and 
Untiedt [2] have argued that the EG index is still affected by the size of an industry 
indirectly and in a non-linear fashion through the Herfindahl index, and they find 
significant effects of scale economies on industrial agglomeration even with the use of 
the EG index. In this paper, we construct average firm size – defined as the total 
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output of an industry divided by the number of firms in the industry – as a proxy of 
scale economies and check if scale economies still matter with the EG index as a 
measure of industrial agglomeration.  
 
It is possible that variations of average firm size across industries may reflect 
differences in capital intensity. To the extent that high capital intensity is caused by 
the presence of high fixed costs, which imply scale economies, then average firm size 
is a good proxy for the extent of scale economies. It is also possible that variations of 
average firm size across industries are due to the differences in the degree of state 
control. Indeed, despite almost thirty years of economic reform, some of China’s 
manufacturing industries are still monopolized by a few state-owned firms, in which 
case the average firm size is not really a proxy for the scale economies.16  
 
Variations in resource endowments across regions are traditionally considered to be an 
important determinant of agglomeration (Ellison and Glaeser [15]; Kim [27]). 
However, its underlying assumption of relatively immobile resources may be less 
valid than it used to be because transportation costs have declined dramatically in 
recent decades. For example, Glaeser and Kohlhase [19] show that costs of moving 
goods declined by over 90% in real terms during the twentieth century. To control for 
the impacts of resource endowments, we construct two proxies of natural advantages 
from the 1997 Input-Output table,17 namely, agricultural products usage ratio and 
mining products usage ratio.18  
 
Regional variations in resource endowments matter only when transportation costs are 
significant. Despite their importance as a control variable in studies of industrial 
agglomeration, transportation costs and their variations across industries in particular 
are not easily measured even in developed economies. Rosenthal and Strange [38] 
insightfully proxy transportation costs using “inventories per dollar of shipment”. 
Presumably, industries that produce highly perishable products face high 
transportation costs per unit of distance, and they seek to locate close to their markets, 
leading to lower inventories per dollar of shipment and less industrial agglomeration. 
                                                        
16 We find that average firm size of state-owned enterprises was indeed larger than that of 
non-state-owned enterprises, though the difference was only statistically significant in the years 2003 
and 2005.  
17 China’s 1997 input-output table was constructed based on flows among 124 sectors, the 
classification of which lies between the 2-digit and 3-digit industrial classifications. Concordance table 
of the 124 sectors with the 3-digit industries is used, which explains why the regression analysis is 
carried out at the 3-digit industry level.    
18 The agricultural category includes crop cultivation, forestry, livestock, fishery and other agriculture 
products; the mining category includes coal, natural gas, ferrous ore, non-ferrous ore, salt, non-mental 
minerals, and timber and bamboo. 
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While a similar variable, “finished goods to output ratio”, could be constructed from 
the ASIF data set, it is not to be used in this study because there are significant 
variations in the finished goods to output ratio between state-owned enterprises and 
non-state-owned enterprises. Being charged with the responsibility of maintaining 
social stability and burdened with surplus labor, state-owned enterprises often make 
products that are not really demanded by the markets and have much higher finished 
goods to output ratios. One could also think of using “selling expenses” - including 
expenses such as salespersons’ salaries and commissions, travel costs, sales office 
payroll and expenses, transportation costs, and advertising and promotion – as a 
broader proxy for the costs of reaching consumers. However, there are also issues of 
differences in the selling expenses between foreign-invested firms and China’s 
domestic firms, with the former focusing a lot more on sales if they are for China’s 
domestic markets. Despite the aforementioned measurement difficulties, it is a general 
consensus that transportation costs are decreasing rapidly in China after massive 
government investment in transportation infrastructures (Li [29]). Hence the roles of 
resource endowments are expected to diminish over time as in the case of other 
countries. 
 
We summarize definitions and summary statistics of the dependent variables and 
independent variables in Table 3. Correlations between the dependent variable and 
independent variables are provided in Table 4. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 here 
 
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Most existing studies on determinants of industrial agglomeration are based on 
cross-sectional data, and suffer from some difficulties of identification such as 
unobserved characteristics and simultaneity in data (Hanson [21]). For example, 
Rosenthal and Strange [38] argue that their estimation of coefficients for variables 
other than likely exogenous natural resource advantages and product shipping costs 
describe the equilibrium relationship between industry characteristics and 
agglomeration. In other words, some industry characteristics affect the propensity to 
agglomerate, while at the same time agglomeration influences these same industry 
characteristics. 
 
While some of these identification problems could be dealt with panel datasets and 
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dynamic estimation methods, it is essential for the panel datasets to have both 
cross-sectional and time variations. Unfortunately, our panel dataset of China’s 
industrial firms is only over a period of eight years: 1998-2005, though one could 
argue that many changes did take place in these eight reform years. Thus we start by 
pooling all observations (firms and years), and run a simple ordinary least square 
regression examining the correlation between the EG index of industrial 
agglomeration and the independent variables constructed in Section 3.1.  
 
The results of pooled cross-sectional regressions at the county level, city level, and 
province level are reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table 5 respectively. The two proxies 
for local protectionism, share of state owned output and local taxes to sales ratio have 
negative coefficients at all three geographic scopes (county level, city level and 
province level); and the coefficients are statistically significant in all combinations 
except that for share of state owned output at the province level. The results support 
the argument that local governments have stronger incentives to protect those 
industries with higher proportions of state ownership and those industries with more 
contribution to local tax revenue.  
 
 
Table 5 here  
 
 
Results on Marshallian externalities are largely consistent with the findings in the 
existing literature. At all three geographic scopes, the coefficients of new products to 
output ratio are positive and statistically significant at 1% level, supporting the 
important role of knowledge spillovers in industrial agglomeration. Positive and 
significant coefficients of exported output to total output ratio at all three geographic 
scopes strongly support the long-standing argument that the need to acquire 
information contributes to spatial concentration, and are consistent with the findings 
in Lovely, Rosenthal, and Sharma [30]. The results of exported output to total output 
ratio could also be interpreted as that industrial agglomeration is more likely in 
regions with better export infrastructures, supporting the role of input sharing. More 
generally, coefficients of purchased-inputs intensity are positive and statistically 
significant at all three geographic scopes, confirming the possibility that input sharing 
could be a contributing factor to localization (Holmes [23]). Lastly, the three 
coefficients of wage premium corresponding to different geographic scopes are all 
positive, and one of them (city level) is statistically significant. This supports the 
prediction that labor pooling enhances industrial agglomeration.  
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Results for the control variables are as expected. The coefficients of average firm size 
are positive at all three geographic scopes, and they are statistically significant at both 
city and province levels. These results suggest that it is still necessary to control for 
the scale economies even when the EG index is used as an indicator of agglomeration. 
Meanwhile, both agricultural products usage ratio and mining products usage ratio 
have positive and statistically significant coefficients at all three geographic scopes, 
implying that regional variations in resource endowments do matter in determining 
the patterns of industrial agglomeration in China’s manufacturing industries. This 
result could be interpreted that transportation costs remain significant in China and as 
a result resources are relatively immobile. It could also be interpreted that local 
governments have protectionist policies on the sales of locally endowed resources and 
nurture industries that have intensive usage of these resources.   
 
If industrial agglomeration and industrial characteristics are both endogenously 
affected by some common factors which have not been controlled for, then industrial 
characteristics are correlated with the error term and the results of the pooled 
cross-sectional regressions reported above are biased. One way for dealing with the 
potential endogeneity issue is the use of instrumental variables, which we take in the 
following analysis. Specifically, we use the data from China’s third industrial census 
conducted in 1995 to construct the instrumental variables for all the independent 
variables discussed in Section 3.1 except those of agricultural products usage ratio 
and mining products usage ratio.19 Two-stage least square estimations with those 
instrumental variables are then performed accordingly, and the results are shown in 
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 5 corresponding to the three different geographic scopes. 
 
Our main results on local protectionism and Marshallian externalities are robust to the 
use of the instrumental variables. The degree of industrial agglomeration is lower for 
industries with higher share of state-owned output or higher local taxes to sales ratios, 
suggesting stronger incentives of local protectionism in these industries. Meanwhile, 
industries with higher new products to output ratios and higher exported output to 
total output ratios – proxies for knowledge spillovers – experience higher degree of 
agglomeration. The positive and statistically significant coefficients of exported 
output to total output ratio and purchased-inputs intensity also lend support to the 
input-sharing type of Marshallian externalities. As in the ordinary least square 
estimations, the effects of wage premium have been found to be generally consistent 
with the literature results, though the coefficients are not as statistically significant as 
                                                        
19 This is because the construction of these two ratios requires the use of 1997 input-output table.  
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those of other proxies for Marshallian externalities. One possibility is that the proxy 
for labor market pooling used in this paper – wage premium – is not the most ideal as 
compared with those used in the literature (Rosenthal and Strange [38]).  
 
As China has undergone significant transformations through economic reforms and 
integration with the world economy, it is likely that the importance of the 
determinants of industrial agglomeration may change over time. For example, some 
of the Marshallian externalities may become more prominent along with rising 
competitiveness of China’s manufacturing and export. Meanwhile the negative 
impacts of local protectionism could be mitigated by the increasing competition in the 
market places. To explore the possibility of those changes over time, we divide our 
sample period into two sub-periods: 1998-2001 (first half) and 2002-2005 (second 
half), and re-estimate using both the ordinary least square method and the two-stage 
least square method with instrumental variables.  
 
Table 6 here 
 
The results of ordinary least square estimations are summarized in Columns 1 to 6 of 
Table 6 with the first three columns for the time period of 1998-2001 and the next 
three columns for the time period of 2002-2005. It is interesting to note that while the 
impacts of share of state-owned output and local taxes to sales ratio are negative in 
both time periods, they are statistically significant only in the first time period (i.e., 
1998-2001). These results suggest that local protectionism has become less of a 
problem over the years. Local protectionist policies are informal tariffs for goods 
made in other regions, and they are only effective when the cost differences between 
local producers and producers of other regions are small enough. However, as China 
continues its economic reform and integration with the world economy, there is more 
entry of foreign multinationals and faster development of China’s non-state-owned 
enterprises, both of which make it more difficult for local protectionist policies to be 
effective. Indeed, as presented in Section 2, the overall time trend of industrial 
agglomeration has been increasing over the sample period, suggesting the dominance 
of the forces for industrial agglomeration over those of local protectionism.  
 
As for the proxies of Marshallian externalities, there are divergent patterns observed 
across the sample period. For example, exported output to total output ratio – a proxy 
for knowledge spillover on how to export to foreign markets and input sharing about 
export infrastructures – has consistent impacts on industrial agglomeration during the 
entire sample period with positive and statistically significant coefficients in both 
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1998-2001 and 2002-2005. The coefficients of new products to output ratio – a proxy 
for knowledge spillover – are positive in both the first half and the second half of the 
sample period, but they are only statistically significant in 2002-2005. One possible 
explanation is that knowledge spillover has become more important as China moves 
up the value chain and focuses on more value-added manufacturing (Rodrik, [37]; 
Schott, [41]) The results for the control variables (such as that for scale economies 
and those for resource endowments) are quite consistent across the sample period.   
 
Columns 7 to 12 of Table 6 are the corresponding results of the two-stage least square 
estimations with instrumental variables constructed using data from China’s third 
industrial census. The negative impacts of local protectionism – proxied by both share 
of state-owned output and local taxes to sales ratio – have become less significant 
over time. Exported output to total output ratio has had consistent impacts across the 
sample period, while new products to output ratio has gained importance increased 
over time. These results are very similar to those of ordinary least square estimations 
reported in columns 1 to 6 of Table 7, suggesting that our results are robust to controls 
for the potential endogeneity problems.  
 
Taken together, the results summarized in Tables 5 and 6 show that both local 
protectionism and Marshallian externalities are key determinants of industrial 
agglomeration in China with the former becoming less significant over time whereas 
the latter gaining strength across the sample period.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper empirically examines the trends and determinants of China’s industrial 
agglomeration using a large firm-level data set for the period of 1998-2005. We first 
compute the measure of agglomeration developed by Ellison and Glaeser [14]. Our 
results show that industrial agglomeration in China has increased consistently 
between 1998 and 2005. The increasing trend is robust in all combinations of 
industrial and geographic scopes, in contrast to the results of earlier studies such as 
Young [44] and Poncet [36]. Comparing with selected developed countries, however, 
we find that China’s industrial agglomeration remains considerably lower.  
 
Next we investigate the determinants of China’s industrial agglomeration with a focus 
on local protectionism and Marshallian externalities. It is found that industrial 
agglomeration is lower in industries with greater contributions to local tax revenues 
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and in industries with higher degrees of state ownership, suggesting the role of local 
protectionism among China’s various regions in obstructing the process of spatial 
concentration of manufacturing industries. Meanwhile, there is evidence supporting 
the positive role of Marshallian externalities such as knowledge spillovers and input 
sharing in contributing to China’s industrial agglomeration. Most interestingly, it is 
found that local protectionism has become less of a concern over time while 
Marshallian externalities are gaining strength across the sample period, consistent 
with the rising trend of China’s industrial agglomeration over the sample period and 
possibly due to China’s increasing integration with the world economy. Our results 
are robust to the inclusion of proxies for scale economies and resource endowments, 
and the use of instrumental variables for controlling the potential endogeneity 
problems.  
 
Industrial agglomeration has been considered a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage for a national or regional economy. It has been studied extensively by 
economists dating back to Adam Smith. In recent years, attention has been shifted 
towards the political factors that may contribute or obstruct the process of industrial 
agglomeration. In this paper, we focus on the relation between China’s central and 
local government that has undergone dramatic changes during China’s economic 
reform, and investigate the role of local protectionism, unleashed by the fiscal 
decentralization key to China’s economic reform, on the degree of China’s industrial 
agglomeration. Our study contributes to the literature by incorporating some of the 
unique features in the developing and transition economy of China. It also provides 
evidence on the Marshallian externalities in the setting of developing economies, 
lending support to those governments for enacting policies nurturing the externality 
economies and facilitating the process of industrial agglomeration. Future work on 
China’s industrial agglomeration should be directed at collecting data at the plant 
level and having a closer look at the interactions between market forces for industrial 
agglomeration and the political factors against it. 
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Table 1a: Sample size of the data set (number of firms by year) 
Number of firm \ Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
The original data including (1) 
mining, (2) manufacturing, and (3) 
production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 164,981 161,888 162,741 171,117 181,428 196,206 270,425 265,739 
The data set of manufacturing firms 
only 149,556 146,985 148,243 156,862 167,046 181,508 251,628 246,379 
The data set of manufacturing firms 
only after deleting those 
observations with missing or zero 
employment 143,968 140,659 142,407 152,311 162,573 178,275 246,625 244,315 
Percentage of firms with missing or 
zero employment 3.7% 4.3% 3.9% 2.9% 2.7% 1.8% 2.0％ 0.8％
 
 
Table 1b: Number of firms by industry and year  
Industry 
Number 
of firms
1998
Number 
of firms
1999
Number 
of firms
2000
Number 
of firms
2001
Number 
of firms
2002
Number 
of firms 
2003
Number 
of firms 
2004 
Number 
of firms 
2005 
Food Processing 11,238 10,494 9,921 9,778 9,907 10,412 13,299 13,885 
Food Production 4,960 4,533 4,311 4,268 4,358 4,565 4,886 4,912 
Beverage Production 3,561 3,324 3,174 3,110 3,125 3,152 3,392 3,483 
Tobacco Processing 342 333 330 306 276 244 207 184 
Textile Industry 10,846 10,512 10,552 11,805 12,975 14,272 22,315 21,113 
Garments & Other Fiber Products 6,612 6,462 6,929 7,974 8,935 10,111 11,775 11,755 
Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 3,211 3,064 3,057 3,449 3,861 4,460 6,083 5,983 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane,  
Palm Fiber & Straw Products 2,357 2,300 2,445 2,711 2,952 3,472 4,654 5,015 
Furniture Manufacturing 1,411 1,419 1,453 1,594 1,731 1,933 3,005 3,084 
Papermaking & Paper Products 4,581 4,466 4,479 4,868 5,142 5,536 7,300 7,309 
Printing & Record Pressing 3,754 3,646 3,551 3,562 3,687 3,780 4,564 4,400 
Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 1,751 1,762 1,837 2,003 2,290 2,584 3,676 3,603 
Petroleum Processing, Coking Products,  
& Gas Production & Supply 1,003 955 958 994 1,113 1,279 1,932 1,930 
Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 10,850 10,846 10,934 11,620 12,252 13,530 18,589 18,861 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 3,144 3,116 3,165 3,364 3,569 3,721 4,238 4,523 
Chemical Fibers 782 784 807 870 897 1,001 1,733 1,543 
Rubber Products 1,724 1,746 1,728 1,733 1,775 1,981 3,017 2,945 
Plastic Products 5,874 5,874 6,073 6,768 7,534 8,397 12,124 12,093 
Nonmetal Mineral Products 14,011 13,874 14,049 14,285 14,923 16,061 19,431 19,684 
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 3,094 2,911 2,864 3,058 3,215 3,702 6,225 5,922 
Smelting & Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 2,316 2,312 2,442 2,730 2,856 3,173 4,649 4,611 
Metal Products 7,919 7,870 8,119 9,097 9,832 10,946 15,885 15,734 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 9,076 8,884 9,092 9,841 10,579 11,899 17,981 17,737 
Special Equipment Manufacturing 6,421 6,161 6,155 6,214 6,367 6,880 10,717 10,231 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 6,519 6,378 6,565 6,948 7,322 8,045 11,532 11,200 
Electric Equipment & Machinery 7,367 7,384 7,659 8,528 9,243 10,222 15,699 15,143 
Electronic & Telecommunications 4,024 4,073 4,298 4,735 5,237 5,845 8,928 8,723 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural  
& Official Machinery 1,754 1,709 1,790 1,972 2,090 2,230 3,390 3,302 
Other Manufacturing 3,466 3,467 3,670 4,126 4,530 4,842 5,399 5,407 
Total 143,968 140,659 142,407 152,311 162,573 178,275 246,625 244,315 
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Table 1c: Size of employment by year and industry 
Industry 
Number 
of 
employee 
1998 
Number 
of 
employee 
1999 
Number 
of 
employee 
2000 
Number 
of 
employee 
2001 
Number 
of 
employee 
2002 
Number 
of 
employee 
2003 
Number 
of 
employee 
2004 
Number 
of 
employee 
2005 
Food Processing 1,973 1,783 1,655 1,648 1,710 1,736 1,846 2,078 
Food Production 1,002 955 905 891 972 1,040 1,063 1,142 
Beverage Production 1,130 1,050 1,008 936 901 873 824 873 
Tobacco Processing 290 278 257 246 231 211 194 195 
Textile Industry 5,710 5,068 4,800 4,746 4,755 4,863 5,562 5,599 
Garments & Other Fiber Products 2,112 2,024 2,153 2,366 2,648 3,005 3,271 3,458 
Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 1,103 1,093 1,125 1,265 1,408 1,647 2,043 2,221 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane,  
Palm Fiber & Straw Products 492 471 492 509 516 584 713 781 
Furniture Manufacturing 249 253 270 297 338 419 652 719 
Papermaking & Paper Products 1,270 1,180 1,119 1,130 1,140 1,144 1,279 1,277 
Printing & Record Pressing 670 601 555 543 552 553 572 596 
Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 613 639 651 668 754 867 1,099 1,142 
Petroleum Processing, Coking Products,  
& Gas Production & Supply 779 716 634 591 556 600 654 708 
Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 3,858 3,682 3,435 3,157 3,081 3,078 3,266 3,435 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 1,025 994 990 1,020 1,045 1,073 1,062 1,154 
Chemical Fibers 480 459 428 402 377 377 432 467 
Rubber Products 761 707 664 612 611 626 788 779 
Plastic Products 1,098 1,108 1,110 1,167 1,291 1,439 1,768 1,862 
Nonmetal Mineral Products 4,502 4,310 4,083 3,889 3,860 3,916 4,081 4,151 
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 2,953 2,751 2,602 2,477 2,378 2,501 2,607 2,708 
Smelting & Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 1,120 1,078 1,053 1,090 1,022 1,035 1,155 1,190 
Metal Products 1,746 1,648 1,615 1,642 1,732 1,897 2,453 2,604 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 3,392 3,012 2,835 2,703 2,628 2,772 3,110 3,223 
Special Equipment Manufacturing 2,516 2,172 2,056 1,843 1,771 1,787 2,042 2,007 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 3,356 3,160 3,052 2,955 2,958 3,079 3,365 3,485 
Electric Equipment & Machinery 2,377 2,277 2,285 2,249 2,383 2,643 3,361 3,572 
Electronic & Telecommunications 1,840 1,854 1,960 2,047 2,290 2,746 3,680 4,351 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural  
& Official Machinery 636 575 559 552 571 621 686 727 
Other Manufacturing 907 916 963 1,005 1,080 1,183 1,283 1,329 
Total 49,961 46,813 45,316 44,646 45,559 48,315 54,909 57,833 
Note: Numbers in the table are in thousand. 
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Table 2a: Weighted means and summary statistics of industrial agglomeration in 
China’s manufacturing industries (indices calculated based on employment data 
and weighted by employment) 
 
Industry and Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Change 
(1998-2005)
2-digit industry                   
County 0.0018 0.0018 0.0022 0.0023 0.0026 0.0033 0.0046 0.0048 0.0030
City 0.0042 0.0045 0.0052 0.0058 0.0066 0.0077 0.0100 0.0104 0.0062
Province 0.0173 0.0194 0.0216 0.0230 0.0267 0.0305 0.0363 0.0370 0.0197
3-digit industry           
County 0.0043 0.0040 0.0047 0.0051 0.0059 0.0069 0.0085 0.0089 0.0046
City 0.0092 0.0094 0.0108 0.0118 0.0133 0.0151 0.0184 0.0193 0.0101
Province 0.0316 0.0341 0.0377 0.0399 0.0451 0.0500 0.0578 0.0593 0.0277
4-digit industry           
County 0.0064 0.0063 0.0077 0.0083 0.0097 0.0111 0.0131 0.0133 0.0069
City 0.0128 0.0131 0.0156 0.0172 0.0197 0.0217 0.0257 0.0263 0.0135
Province 0.0402 0.0433 0.0484 0.0510 0.0580 0.0631 0.0723 0.0741 0.0339
 
 
Table 2b: Agglomeration of China’s manufacturing industries at 2-digit industry 
level and county level (indices calculated based on employment data) 
 
  γ index 
Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Change 
(1998-2005) 
Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 0.0194 0.0203 0.0213 0.0176 0.0175 0.0191 0.0205 0.0206 0.0012 
Electronic & Telecommunications 0.0069 0.0069 0.0083 0.0095 0.0103 0.0123 0.0178 0.0175 0.0105 
Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 0.0035 0.0052 0.0058 0.0064 0.0080 0.0091 0.0105 0.0102 0.0067 
Furniture Manufacturing 0.0013 0.0020 0.0019 0.0018 0.0024 0.0057 0.0076 0.0081 0.0068 
Chemical Fibers 0.0008 0.0012 0.0014 0.0012 0.0023 0.0031 0.0062 0.0061 0.0053 
Electric Equipment & Machinery 0.0015 0.0014 0.0018 0.0022 0.0027 0.0039 0.0052 0.0056 0.0041 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane,  
Palm Fiber & Straw Products 0.0014 0.0013 0.0017 0.0022 0.0024 0.0033 0.0053 0.0054 0.0040 
Petroleum Processing, Coking Products,  
& Gas Production & Supply 0.0021 0.0022 0.0093 0.0045 0.0042 0.0054 0.0052 0.0051 0.0031 
Food Processing 0.0010 0.0011 0.0014 0.0014 0.0019 0.0028 0.0038 0.0042 0.0032 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural  
& Official Machinery 0.0019 0.0019 0.0022 0.0020 0.0024 0.0030 0.0037 0.0040 0.0021 
Smelting & Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 0.0023 0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 0.0028 0.0030 0.0036 0.0037 0.0014 
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.0011 0.0011 0.0008 0.0011 0.0016 0.0022 0.0034 0.0036 0.0025 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.0019 0.0019 0.0020 0.0024 0.0025 0.0026 0.0032 0.0034 0.0015 
Plastic Products 0.0021 0.0027 0.0024 0.0022 0.0022 0.0021 0.0034 0.0033 0.0012 
Other Manufacturing 0.0030 0.0030 0.0032 0.0033 0.0036 0.0036 0.0032 0.0032 0.0002 
Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 0.0014 0.0018 0.0027 0.0030 0.0021 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0009 0.0012 0.0016 0.0026 0.0028 0.0024 
Garments & Other Fiber Products 0.0054 0.0034 0.0029 0.0027 0.0026 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 -0.0027 
Textile Industry 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0014 0.0018 0.0027 0.0026 0.0016 
Tobacco Processing 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0009 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0026 0.0025 
Food Production 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0020 0.0022 0.0016 
Beverage Production 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 0.0013 0.0022 0.0022 0.0016 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010 0.0012 0.0015 0.0021 0.0022 0.0013 
Raw Chemical Materials  
& Chemical Products 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011 0.0020 0.0021 0.0016 
Rubber Products 0.0010 0.0012 0.0015 0.0008 0.0012 0.0012 0.0019 0.0021 0.0011 
Special Equipment Manufacturing 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0011 0.0013 0.0015 0.0014 0.0014 0.0006 
Printing & Record Pressing 0.0000 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 0.0014 0.0014 
Papermaking & Paper Products 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 0.0007 
Metal Products 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0011 0.0012 0.0005 
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  Gini index 
Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Change 
(2005-1998) 
Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 0.0221 0.0230 0.0236 0.0196 0.0193 0.0208 0.0219 0.0222 0.0001 
Electronic & Telecommunications 0.0084 0.0083 0.0096 0.0107 0.0114 0.0135 0.0189 0.0188 0.0104 
Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 0.0050 0.0069 0.0077 0.0080 0.0094 0.0104 0.0115 0.0113 0.0063 
Furniture Manufacturing 0.0037 0.0046 0.0043 0.0038 0.0042 0.0077 0.0091 0.0095 0.0059 
Chemical Fibers 0.0107 0.0105 0.0118 0.0097 0.0099 0.0111 0.0120 0.0139 0.0032 
Electric Equipment & Machinery 0.0024 0.0023 0.0027 0.0030 0.0035 0.0047 0.0057 0.0062 0.0038 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane,  
Palm Fiber & Straw Products 0.0037 0.0042 0.0041 0.0041 0.0039 0.0044 0.0065 0.0065 0.0028 
Petroleum Processing, Coking Products,  
& Gas Production & Supply 0.0218 0.0231 0.0246 0.0177 0.0135 0.0127 0.0104 0.0102 -0.0116 
Food Processing 0.0018 0.0017 0.0021 0.0032 0.0062 0.0038 0.0045 0.0049 0.0031 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural  
& Official Machinery 0.0044 0.0044 0.0047 0.0042 0.0044 0.0051 0.0054 0.0058 0.0014 
Smelting & Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 0.0092 0.0094 0.0099 0.0097 0.0091 0.0087 0.0083 0.0082 -0.0010 
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.0117 0.0124 0.0138 0.0137 0.0133 0.0118 0.0107 0.0111 -0.0006 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.0045 0.0044 0.0046 0.0048 0.0046 0.0045 0.0040 0.0049 0.0004 
Plastic Products 0.0028 0.0034 0.0031 0.0030 0.0028 0.0026 0.0037 0.0036 0.0008 
Other Manufacturing 0.0043 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 0.0044 0.0044 0.0041 0.0040 -0.0004 
Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.0012 0.0013 0.0014 0.0015 0.0017 0.0020 0.0029 0.0032 0.0019 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 0.0022 0.0023 0.0024 0.0029 0.0032 0.0034 0.0041 0.0044 0.0022 
Garments & Other Fiber Products 0.0065 0.0040 0.0035 0.0032 0.0031 0.0033 0.0032 0.0031 -0.0034 
Textile Industry 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0019 0.0024 0.0032 0.0032 0.0018 
Tobacco Processing 0.0067 0.0072 0.0073 0.0081 0.0090 0.0099 0.0130 0.0175 0.0108 
Food Production 0.0017 0.0020 0.0022 0.0025 0.0030 0.0030 0.0036 0.0040 0.0023 
Beverage Production 0.0020 0.0021 0.0024 0.0026 0.0031 0.0036 0.0043 0.0051 0.0031 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0018 0.0021 0.0024 0.0025 0.0010 
Raw Chemical Materials  
& Chemical Products 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018 0.0025 0.0027 0.0009 
Rubber Products 0.0039 0.0039 0.0046 0.0036 0.0042 0.0041 0.0041 0.0042 0.0003 
Special Equipment Manufacturing 0.0021 0.0022 0.0028 0.0023 0.0024 0.0027 0.0022 0.0023 0.0002 
Printing & Record Pressing 0.0044 0.0016 0.0018 0.0022 0.0029 0.0030 0.0026 0.0026 -0.0018 
Papermaking & Paper Products 0.0014 0.0016 0.0017 0.0021 0.0025 0.0023 0.0022 0.0021 0.0007 
Metal Products 0.0013 0.0013 0.0015 0.0014 0.0016 0.0017 0.0013 0.0015 0.0002 
 
  Herfindahl index 
Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Change 
(2005-1998) 
Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 0.0027 0.0028 0.0024 0.0020 0.0018 0.0018 0.0014 0.0016 -0.0011 
Electronic & Telecommunications 0.0015 0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0014 -0.0001 
Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 0.0015 0.0018 0.0019 0.0016 0.0014 0.0013 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0004 
Furniture Manufacturing 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0009 
Chemical Fibers 0.0099 0.0093 0.0104 0.0085 0.0076 0.0080 0.0059 0.0079 -0.0020 
Electric Equipment & Machinery 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane,  
Palm Fiber & Straw Products 0.0023 0.0029 0.0023 0.0019 0.0015 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 -0.0012 
Petroleum Processing, Coking Products,  
& Gas Production & Supply 0.0198 0.0210 0.0155 0.0133 0.0094 0.0074 0.0053 0.0051 -0.0147 
Food Processing 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0018 0.0043 0.0011 0.0007 0.0007 0.0000 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural  
& Official Machinery 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025 0.0022 0.0020 0.0021 0.0017 0.0018 -0.0007 
Smelting & Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 0.0069 0.0070 0.0074 0.0073 0.0063 0.0058 0.0047 0.0046 -0.0024 
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.0106 0.0113 0.0130 0.0126 0.0118 0.0097 0.0074 0.0075 -0.0031 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 0.0024 0.0022 0.0018 0.0008 0.0015 -0.0010 
Plastic Products 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 
Other Manufacturing 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 0.0013 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0006 
Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 0.0018 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019 0.0016 0.0016 -0.0001 
Garments & Other Fiber Products 0.0011 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0008 
Textile Industry 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0001 
Tobacco Processing 0.0066 0.0071 0.0069 0.0073 0.0080 0.0087 0.0117 0.0151 0.0084 
Food Production 0.0011 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016 0.0018 0.0016 0.0016 0.0018 0.0007 
Beverage Production 0.0014 0.0016 0.0018 0.0019 0.0021 0.0024 0.0022 0.0030 0.0015 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 
Raw Chemical Materials  0.0012 0.0014 0.0010 0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0007 
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& Chemical Products 
Rubber Products 0.0030 0.0027 0.0031 0.0028 0.0030 0.0029 0.0022 0.0022 -0.0008 
Special Equipment Manufacturing 0.0012 0.0013 0.0019 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0003 
Printing & Record Pressing 0.0044 0.0009 0.0010 0.0011 0.0014 0.0014 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0032 
Papermaking & Paper Products 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0000 
Metal Products 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0003 
 
 
Table 2c: Comparison of iγ index of China’s manufacturing industries with 
those of other countries 
 
     Percentage of industries that are 
Literature Country Year Industry Region 
not very 
concentrated 
somewhat 
concentrated 
very 
concentrated
Ellison and Glaeser （1997） U.S. 1987 459, 4-digit  3000 counties 10.00% 65.00% 25.00%
Devereux, Griffith and Simpson（2004） U.K. 1992 211, 4-digit  477 Zip codes 65.00% 19.00% 16.00%
Maurel and Sedillot （1999） France 1993 273, 4-digit 95 counties 50.00% 23.00% 27.00%
This paper China 2005 537, 4-digit 2862 counties 75.98% 16.2% 7.82%
Note: Industries with 0.05iγ > , 0.02 0.05iγ≤ ≤ , and 0.02iγ <  are defined as very concentrated, somewhat concentrated, and 
not very concentrated, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Definitions and summary statistics of key variables 
 
Variable Name Definition N Mean SD Min Max 
EG index (3-digit, county) 
EG index calculated at 3-digit industry level and 
county level 1277 0.0083 0.0162 -0.0232 0.2798
EG index (3-digit, city) 
EG index calculated at 3-digit industry level and 
city level 1277 0.0160 0.0240 -0.0657 0.3928
EG index (3-digit, province) 
EG index calculated at 3-digit industry level and 
province level 1277 0.0459 0.0630 -0.4371 0.4336
Share of state owned output 
(state ownership * output / sum of all types of 
ownership) * total output 1277 0.2741 0.2157 0 1
Local taxes to sales ratio 
(25% of value added tax + corporate income tax 
paid by local SOEs, COEs, and private
enterprises + business tax from the sales of
services + all other taxes) / total sales 1277 0.0242 0.0086 0.0021 0.0825
Wage premium 
 
1277 1.0083 0.2344 0.4497 3.4842
Purchased-inputs intensity purchased-inputs / total output 1277 0.7894 0.1168 0.4186 3.3075
New products to output ratio 
total new products of an industry / total output
of the industry 1277 0.0729 0.0893 0 0.6429
Exported output to total output ratio 
output exported of an industry / total output of 
the industry 1277 0.2348 0.1984 0 0.8820
Average firm size 
total output of an industry / number of firms in
the industry 1277 0.3040 0.3583 0.0438 4.6567
Agricultural products usage ratio share of inputs from agricultural sectors 1277 0.0912 0.1752 0 0.8086
Mining products usage ratio share of inputs from mining sectors 1277 0.0531 0.1185 0 0.7180
Note: Industry variables are calculated at the 3-digit industry level. 
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Table 4:   Correlations between dependent and independent variables 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EG Index (3-digit, county) (1) 1         
Share of state owned output (2) -0.206 1        
Local taxes to sales ratio (3) -0.092 0.330 1       
Wage premium (4) -0.048 0.348 0.074 1      
Purchased-inputs intensity (5) 0.084 -0.134 -0.170 -0.107 1     
New products to output ratio (6) 0.007 0.276 -0.081 0.392 -0.044 1    
Exported output to total output ratio (7) -0.004 0.266 0.010 0.216 -0.046 0.285 1   
Average firm size (8) 0.313 -0.164 -0.209 -0.164 0.050 -0.032 -0.054 1  
Agricultural products usage ratio (9) -0.048 -0.018 0.000 -0.143 -0.011 -0.207 -0.084 -0.162 1 
Mining products usage ratio (10) 0.097 0.183 0.153 0.071 0.056 -0.154 0.048 -0.267 -0.182 1
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at 5% level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5: Pooled cross-sectional regressions 
  OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  County  City  Province County  City   Province  
Share of state owned output -0.00996 *** -0.0103 ** -0.00836  -0.014 *** -0.0113 ** -0.00767  
 (0.0030)  (0.0043)  (0.0110)  (0.0036)  (0.0051) (0.0130)  
       
Local taxes to sales ratio -0.27 *** -0.528 *** -0.369 * -0.272 *** -0.55 *** -0.772 ***
 (0.0590)  (0.0840)  (0.2100)  (0.0750)  (0.1100) (0.2700)  
       
Wage premium 0.00112  0.00534 * 0.00455  -0.00224  0.00251 0.0258 ** 
 (0.0020)  (0.0029)  (0.0073)  (0.0030)  (0.0043) (0.0110)  
       
Purchased-inputs intensity 0.00938 *** 0.0222 *** 0.0354 ** 0.00606  0.0204 0.0973 ** 
 (0.0045)  (0.0064)  (0.0160)  (0.0120)  (0.0170) (0.0430)  
       
New products to output ratio 0.0184 *** 0.0318 *** 0.0764 *** 0.0235 *** 0.0336 *** 0.0956 ***
 (0.0057)  (0.0081)  (0.0200)  (0.0061)  (0.0087) (0.0220)  
       
Exported output to  0.0328 *** 0.0605 *** 0.169 *** 0.0292 *** 0.0593 *** 0.179 ***
total output ratio (0.0028)  (0.0040)  (0.0100)  (0.0032)  (0.0045) (0.0110)  
       
Average firm size 0.00226  0.0066 *** 0.0256 *** 0.00296 * 0.008 *** 0.0341 ***
 (0.0014)  (0.0020)  (0.0049)  (0.0015)  (0.0022) (0.0055)  
       
Agricultural products  0.00791 *** 0.0252 *** 0.0775 *** 0.00723 *** 0.0248 *** 0.0795 ***
usage ratio (0.0026)  (0.0037)  (0.0093)  (0.0026)  (0.0037) (0.0095)  
       
Mining products usage ratio 0.0314 *** 0.0531 *** 0.161 *** 0.0321 *** 0.053 *** 0.162 ***
 (0.0039)  (0.0056)  (0.0140)  (0.0040)  (0.0057) (0.0150)  
       
year1999 0.000466  0.000133  0.0021  0.000746  0.00000997 0.00192  
 (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0060)  (0.0017)  (0.0024) (0.0060)  
       
year2000 0.000681  0.00247  0.00709  0.000335  0.00238 0.00717  
 (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0060)  (0.0017)  (0.0024) (0.0061)  
       
yr2001 0.00024  0.00141  0.00895  0.000835  0.00129 0.00978  
 (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0061)  (0.0017)  (0.0025) (0.0063)  
       
year2002 0.000414  0.00249  0.0125 ** 0.000256  0.00238 0.0137 ** 
 (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0062)  (0.0018)  (0.0025) (0.0064)  
       
year2003 0.000838  0.0042 * 0.0175 *** 0.0000376  0.0041 0.0196 ***
 (0.0018)  (0.0025)  (0.0063)  (0.0018)  (0.0026) (0.0066)  
       
year2004 0.000969  0.00474 * 0.0142 ** 0.000409  0.00477 0.00136  
 (0.0020)  (0.0028)  (0.0071)  (0.0029)  (0.0041) (0.0100)  
       
year2005 0.00336 * 0.00967 *** 0.0244 *** 0.00183  0.00919 *** 0.0248 ***
 (0.0018)  (0.0026)  (0.0066)  (0.0020)  (0.0028) (0.0071)  
       
Observations 1277  1277  1277  1277  1277 1277  
R-squared 0.17  0.24  0.30 0.17  0.24  0.28   
*, **, and *** stand for significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
In columns (4)-(6), instruments are from the third national industrial census in 1995 for variables except for agricultural products 
usage ratio and mining products usage ratio. Agricultural products usage ratio and mining products usage ratio are used as 
instruments for themselves. 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional regressions on two-period average 
  OLS 2SLS 
 1998-2001 average 2002-2005 average 1998-2001 average 2002-2005 average 
 County City Province County City Province County City Province County City Province 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Share of state owned output -0.0154 *** -0.0127 * -0.0087 -0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0106 ** -0.0084 -0.0233 -0.0197 -0.0153 -0.0294 
 (0.0049) (0.0076) (0.0250) (0.0092) (0.0130) (0.0390) (0.0053) (0.0081) (0.0260) (0.0180) (0.0150) (0.0430) 
Local taxes to sales ratio -0.3000 ** -0.6620 *** -0.5400 -0.0523 -0.1800 -0.0141 -0.3570 * -0.7350 *** -1.0890 -0.1710 -0.4010 -0.4350 
 (0.1300) (0.2000) (0.6700) (0.1700) (0.2500) (0.7000) (0.1900) (0.2800) (0.7700) (0.2000) (0.3000) (0.9800) 
Wage premium 0.0104 0.0086 0.0203 0.0003 0.0038 0.0421 0.0029 0.0005 0.0023 0.0065 0.0009 0.0523 
 (0.0048) (0.0074) (0.0240) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0280) (0.0055) (0.0084) (0.0270) (0.0073) (0.0110) (0.0310) 
Purchased-inputs intensity 0.0164 0.0035 0.0907 0.0208 0.0358 0.0984 0.0333 0.0298 0.0042 0.0155 0.0337 0.1290 * 
 (0.0320) (0.0500) (0.1600) (0.0150) (0.0220) (0.0640) (0.0670) (0.0990) (0.3300) (0.0160) (0.0240) (0.0690) 
New products to output ratio 0.0195 0.0313 0.0395 0.0301 *** 0.0386 ** 0.1090 * 0.0194 * 0.0244 0.0273 0.0415 ** 0.0552 ** 0.1370 **
 (0.0150) (0.0220) (0.0550) (0.0110) (0.0170) (0.0650) (0.0120) (0.0180) (0.0570) (0.0160) (0.0240) (0.0690) 
Exported output to  0.0207 *** 0.0517 *** 0.1740 *** 0.0375 *** 0.0642 *** 0.1590 *** 0.0223 *** 0.0507 *** 0.1720 *** 0.0358 *** 0.0696 *** 0.1950 ***
total output ratio (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0270) (0.0070) (0.0100) (0.0300) (0.0061) (0.0091) (0.0290) (0.0076) (0.0110) (0.0320) 
Average firm size 0.0031 0.0055 * 0.0196 * -0.0009 0.0084 0.0596 *** 0.0025 0.0056 * 0.0255 ** 0.0041 0.0118 * 0.0506 **
 (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0100) (0.0044) (0.0065) (0.0190) (0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0100) (0.0047) (0.0069) (0.0200) 
Agricultural products  0.0064 0.0226 *** 0.0644 *** 0.0101 * 0.0276 *** 0.0884 *** 0.0067 0.0227 *** 0.0653 *** 0.0100 0.0301 *** 0.1010 ***
usage ratio (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0220) (0.0060) (0.0088) (0.0260) (0.0047) (0.0071) (0.0230) (0.0062) (0.0091) (0.0270) 
Mining products usage ratio 0.0343 *** 0.0537 *** 0.1440 *** 0.0290 *** 0.0522 *** 0.1850 *** 0.0346 *** 0.0546 *** 0.1400 *** 0.0367 *** 0.0624 *** 0.1950 ***
 (0.0070) (0.0110) (0.0350) (0.0093) (0.0140) (0.0400) (0.0082) (0.0130) (0.0410) (0.0097) (0.0140) (0.0410) 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
R-squared 0.3  0.34 0.33 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.28  0.32 0.33 0.24 0.32 0.36 
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*, **, and *** stand for significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
In columns (7)-(12), instruments are from the third national industrial census in 1995 for variables except for agricultural products usage ratio and mining products usage ratio. Agricultural products usage ratio 
and mining products usage ratio are used as instruments for themselves. 
 
 
 
  
 
